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Britain, America and the origins of the European Payments Union: A 
Reassessment 
Over  the  past  two  decades,  economic  historians  have  rediscovered  the 
European Payments Union (EPU) and reinstated it as a cornerstone of post-
war western European recovery. The EPU was a mechanism by which member 
countries  of  the  Organisation  for  European Economic  Cooperation  (OEEC) 
could  settle  their  payments  surpluses  and  deficits  with  one  another  on  a 
multilateral basis, removing the need for restrictive bilateral arrangements. 
Deficit countries were allowed a significant margin of credit before reaching 
the  ‘gold  points’  where  they  were  required  to  make  payment  partially  or 
wholly  in  gold.  There  is  wide  spread  consensus  in  the  literature  that  the 
creation of the EPU in 1950, in combination with the liberalisation of intra-
European trade through the OEEC, sparked the recovery of trading relations 
between  western  European  economies.  This  in  turn  contributed  to  the 
economic boom of the 1950s and 1960s, and helped lay the foundations for 
the creation of the Common Market in 1958.1 
The British decision to join EPU could be seen as surprising, not least because 
the  country’s  policy-makers  attached  great  importance  of  maintaining 
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economic links with the Commonwealth/Empire and the rest of the Sterling 
Area, connections of which the new institution could be seen as subversive. 
Therefore,  it  is  fairly  natural  that  historians  should  have  offered  radically 
different explanation for Britain’s decision to join. One perspective stresses 
the importance of American pressure. Peter Burnham argues that this proved 
crucial in persuading a reluctant British government to join EPU, and stresses 
that,  by  joining,  Britain  formally  abandoned  the  option  of  creating  an 
independent  economic  bloc  based  on  the  Sterling  Area.2 Likewise,  Jacob 
Kaplan and Günther Schleiminger, in their seminal study on EPU, argue that 
throughout the negotiations that created it, the US blueprint remained to all 
intents and purposes intact. While the Americans showed flexibility in making 
concessions to the British and Belgian governments, the authors suggest that 
these  did  not  affect  the  essentials  of  the  plan  and  had  little  practical 
significance  for  the  working  of  the  scheme.3 A  second  perspective,  by 
contrast,  rejects  the  idea  that  American  pressure  was  responsible.  Alan 
Milward, for example, argues that Britain’s accession to EPU represented, if 
not a victory for the British government, then certainly a defeat for American 
foreign  economic  policy  and  its  attempts  to  push  European  governments 
toward  integrating  their  economies.  His  account  stresses  that  British 
negotiators, most especially the Minister of State for Economic Affairs, Hugh 
Gaitskell,  extracted major concessions from the Americans.4 More recently, 
Scott  Kelly  has  followed a  similar  line.5 There  is  also  a  third  category  of 
explanation,  put  forward  by  Alec  Cairncross:  ‘the  inclusion  of  the  United 
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Kingdom, and with it the whole of the sterling area, in the EPU was something 
of a fluke.”6 
The  existing  accounts  analyse  the  EPU  negotiations  without  taking  into 
account other important issues preoccupying western policy-makers in late 
1949 and early 1950. Britain’s decision to join EPU can only be understood by 
placing  the  negotiations  into  the  wider  political  context  of  international 
relations  at  the  time.  Despite  reservations  about  the  American  proposals, 
senior  British  policy-makers  attached  great  priority  to  securing  an  EPU 
agreement in order to clear a major stumbling bloc in the path of reviving the 
‘special’ Anglo-American relationship. At the highest level, British ministers 
decided to join EPU in order to gain American support for a strengthening of 
NATO and an increase in the American contribution to western defence. Given 
the primacy of this objective, the government conceded on the formation of 
EPU,  because  American  policy-makers  signalled  that  continued  British 
opposition to American plans would not only sour Anglo-American relations 
but also undermine western military co-operation.7
Moreover,  historians  have  generally  dismissed  the  statements  by  British 
ministers  throughout  the negotiations  that  they were deeply  committed to 
reconstructing  a  multilateral  international  economy.  This  study  will 
demonstrate that these statements should not be dismissed merely because 
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American and Western European policy-makers perceived British demands for 
special status of sterling within the proposed EPU as an obstructionist tactic. 
Senior  ministers  linked their  commitment to multilateralism and European 
integration directly to western military co-operation. Crucially, the decision to 
proceed with the EPU negotiations on the basis of the American and European 
proposals  occurred  in  the  context  of  bilateral  discussions  between British 
ministers  and  American  policy-makers  about  NATO  reform  and  western 
rearmament in early May 1950. 
In order to illuminate these themes, this article draws on a wide range of 
sources, including oral histories as well as archives, which in some important 
cases have not previously been fully exploited. The first section will examine 
the  attitude  of  Labour  ministers  towards  multilateralism  and  European 
economic  co-operation  prior  to  November  1949,  when  the  Americans 
demanded substantial progress towards European integration. This analysis 
of British attitudes will be followed by an examination of Britain’s response to 
the American proposals for a European clearing union tabled in the wake of 
this  démarche. The next section will examine the breakdown of negotiations 
after the submission of a revised British proposal for the envisaged European 
payments arrangement at the end of January 1950. We will then see how the 
impasse was broken, through the good offices of a civil servant, Sir Edmund 
Hall-Patch. He facilitated contacts between Hugh Gaitskell and the US official 
Milton Katz,8 the two men who would in due course negotiate the agreement 
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securing the financial  guarantees required by the British government.  The 
last section will  recount the developments leading to the conclusion of the 
Katz-Gaitskell  Agreement  in  June  1950  that  removed  the  final  hurdle  to 
Britain’s membership in EPU. Our analysis will stress that policymakers linked 
the EPU negotiations with the process of western co-operation and discussed 
these issues widely outside formal negotiations at multilateral, bilateral and 
national  levels.  In  this  context,  the  intimate  working  relationship  between 
British  and  American  officials  within  the  OEEC  provided  the  basis  for 
establishing close personal contact between the key players in the final stages 
of the negotiations.
Labour and multilateralism
Many contemporary American critics of the Attlee government portrayed it as 
opposing  the  liberalisation  of  international  trade  and  payments.  US 
policymakers resented, in particular, the British attachment to the imperial 
preference system and the sterling area, institutions that were perceived as 
means  to  discriminate  against  dollar  goods,  an  aim  which  in  turn  was 
perceived as illegitimate. This perception of British foreign economic policy 
led  many  US  observers  to  blame  the  Attlee  government  for  the  limited 
progress made by the OEEC in adopting measures for the liberalisation of 
intra-European trade and payments after the organisation’s foundation in the 
spring of 1948. New intra-European payments created a system of bilateral 
agreements between member countries, which revived trading relationships 
6
within a tightly controlled fashion; but this strictly bilateral framework failed 
to  promote  the  expansion  of  intra-European  trade.  Frustrated  with  the 
perceived  intransigence  of  European  governments  on  the  issue  of  further 
liberalisation, the influential American columnist Walter Lippmann wrote to J. 
William  Fulbright  in  March  1949  identifying  Britain  as  main  culprit:  ‘[Sir 
Stafford]  Cripps  [Chancellor  of  the  Exchequer,  1947-50]  admitted  to  me 
privately that he would much rather go it alone, and not be obligated to make 
agreements with the other European nations. The fact is that our people have 
accepted this result without serious resistance.’9 The mounting criticism in 
Washington along these lines led to action by the Truman administration. In 
October  1949,  Paul  Hoffman,  the  head  of  the  European  Co-operation 
Administration  (ECA)  (the  body  that  administered  Marshall  Aid)  made  a 
speech to the OEEC calling for dramatic moves towards the integration of the 
Western European economy.10
The Attlee government was not, in fact, as hostile to multilateralism as many 
on the US side believed. Key Labour politicians, including Hugh Dalton and 
Stafford  Cripps,  as  well  as  Clement  Attlee  himself,  had,  during  wartime, 
supported the creation of a new multilateral international economic order as 
envisaged by the Atlantic Charter and the Bretton Woods agreement. At the 
same time, Labour policy-makers favoured a greater degree of international 
economic  policy  co-ordination  or  planning  to  prevent  another  worldwide 
depression. As in their plans for domestic reconstruction,  they preferred a 
gradual transition to multilateral trade and the liberalisation of international 
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payments. However, some Labour ministers were more apprehensive about 
the plans for a new international economic order. For example, the Foreign 
Secretary,  Ernest  Bevin,  had  initially  feared  that  membership  of  the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) would mean a return to the gold standard 
and  would  thus  potentially  undermine  domestic  economic  reconstruction. 
Bevin had dropped this criticism when it became clear that the 1945 US loan 
would be conditional upon Britain joining the IMF.11 Nevertheless, the fear of 
a  ‘return  to  Gold’  remained  a  deep  apprehension  of  some  British  policy-
makers and this conditioned the initial response to the American proposals for 
a European payments union in 1949 and early 1950. 
Thus,  whilst  a  commitment  to  multilateralism  remained  central  to  British 
foreign economic policy, British policy-makers envisaged a far more limited 
multilateralism than that put forward by their American counter-parts. Given 
Britain’s continued economic  weakness,  there was a  marked reluctance to 
implement  measures  of  liberalisation before  the British  economy was in  a 
sufficiently healthy position to withstand the expected attendant shocks. This 
helps to explain the British negotiating position over EPU. Concerned about 
the possible drain on British reserves due to any such arrangement, British 
policy-makers sought American financial support to resolve the problem of the 
sterling balances or at least a financial guarantee for British reserves within 
the system. 
Moreover, if the British were not hostile to multilateralism per se, they were 
certainly dubious about getting involved with European economic integration. 
8
Despite their accession to the OEEC, they were reluctant to follow the path of 
integration  of  European production  because  ‘we want to  sell  many of  our 
goods  outside  Europe  and  not  be  pressed  to  give  European  needs  undue 
priority’, and also argued, perhaps somewhat opportunistically, that European 
regional arrangements would be inconsistent with the American doctrine of 
global multilateralism.12 While resistant to closer British economic association 
with Europe,  British  officials  attempted to exploit  the American change of 
heart  on  regional  trading  agreements  to  attain  recognition  of  the 
Commonwealth  and  Empire  as  a  regional  trading  area  at  the  Havana 
conference of November 1947 - March 1948. In this context, the idea that 
Western  Europe  –  rather  than  the  less  developed  countries  of  the  former 
colonial  world  -  would  in  the  future  be  the  dynamic  source  of  growth  of 
markets for British goods occurred to few people at this time.13 Nevertheless, 
on British initiative, significant progress was made during 1949 towards the 
dismantling of import restrictions within the OEEC.14
These mixed attitudes provided the context for the British reaction to the first 
outline plan for a European payments union, which the ECA submitted to the 
OEEC on  24  November  1949.  This  provided  for  the  full  transferability  of 
currencies  and  for  an  executive  board  with  considerable  autonomy.15 The 
reaction of Douglas Jay, Economic Secretary to the Treasury, was that if there 
had to be any such scheme, it should ‘do the minimum’.16 In contrast was the 
reaction of Cripps. A document in the Bank of England archive speaks of ‘the 
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Chancellor’s sudden decision to instruct the U.K. delegation [to the OEEC] in 
Paris to put forward a plan for a European Currency Union based on certain 
papers  put  forward  by  the  Economic  Unit  of  the  Cabinet  Offices.’  Some 
Treasury officials defended this alternative to the ECA plan on the grounds 
that  it  ‘would  have  a  great  appeal  to  the  Americans  and  would  produce 
“transferability of all  European currencies”’; but Bank officials were highly 
sceptical, and Sir Edward Bridges, the Permanent Secretary of the Treasury, 
was  deputed  to  restrain  Cripps’s  enthusiasm.17 Accordingly,  the  scheme 
submitted  by  the  British  to  the  OEEC  on  14  December  was  much  more 
cautious.18 At the ministerial  level,  such caution found its key champion in 
Hugh Gaitskell, the Minister of Fuel and Power, and this proved crucial to the 
course of the EPU negotiations in the coming months.
Gaitskell’s changing attitude to EPU
It  is  well  established  that  Gaitskell’s  attitude  to  the  proposed  European 
Payments  Union  changed  dramatically  during  the  first  months  of  1950. 
Originally  he  was  extremely  sceptical.  As  Robert  Hall,  director  of  the 
Economic Section of the Cabinet Secretariat, noted in his diary on 28 March, 
‘it became clear, in connection with the EPU discussions, that H.G. thought we 
should never return to convertibility and never offer anyone gold points.’19 As 
Scott Kelly has noted, given these views ‘it is perhaps surprising that it was 
Gaitskell  himself  who  was  eventually  to  conclude  successfully  the  EPU 
negotiations.’20 What explained this change of heart?
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Gaitskell’s  biographer,  Philip  Williams,  argued  that  four  factors  were 
responsible. First, the position of sterling was improving significantly, in the 
wake  of  devaluation  in  1949:  ‘As  each  new  figure  became  available,  the 
reserves  looked  more  secure  and  the  British  negotiators  breathed  easier.’ 
Second,  Europeans  like  Robert  Marjolin,  the  secretary-general  of  OEEC, 
persuaded  Gaitskell  of  the  depth  of  continental  resentment  at  the  trade 
discrimination  practiced  by  the  British.  Third,  Treasury  advice  helped 
persuade him of the benefits of the scheme. (Favourable advice, indeed, did 
not only come from the Treasury. Alec Cairncross and Nita Watts have argued 
that  the  Economic  Section  made  an  important  contribution  to  ministers’ 
change of  view.)  Finally,  ‘Above all  Gaitskell  discovered that  ...  the  United 
States administration was divided against itself’. He concluded, after meeting 
with representatives of the European Co-operation Administration, that the 
ECA might become allies of the British against the IMF and the US Treasury; 
thus,  the showdown that he had originally  expected to have with the ECA 
became unnecessary.21 
More recently,  Kelly  has  reiterated some of  Williams’s  key points,  but  has 
emphasised Gaitskell’s own belief that he, Gaitskell, had won the argument 
within  the  Treasury.  He  has  also  stressed  that  Gaitskell  agreed  with  the 
Americans on the technical problem of how sterling would relate to the EPU 
in return for satisfaction on gold and credit arrangements, thus limiting the 
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interference of the scheme in domestic economic policy.22 These explanations, 
while differing to some degree on the part played by civil service advice, do 
not seriously challenge Gaitskell’s own opinion, recorded in his diary, that he 
had  broadly  conditioned  the  ECA  representatives  to  his  point  of  view.23 
However, the recollections of Milton Katz, one of the ECA representatives, 
shed a different light on the episode. In an oral history interview conducted in 
1975, and preserved at the Truman Presidential Library, Katz revealed some 
extraordinary details about the process by which Gaitskell came to accept the 
EPU.24 
His evidence must, of course, be treated with some caution. Katz, as might be 
expected, did not give precise dates for the events he described, and this can 
easily lead to error. (For example, Kaplan and Schleiminger, who are aware of 
Katz’s evidence, but make relatively little use of it, misdate the key meeting 
he  describes.)25 He also  exaggerated his  own role  to  a  minor  degree,  not 
mentioning, for instance, that Harriman was also present at a crucial meeting 
with  Gaitskell.  Nevertheless,  comparison  with  other  records,  notably 
Gaitskell’s  diary, confirms important aspects of his account,  and shows his 
detectable errors to be minor:  a ‘lunch’  meeting turns out to have been a 
dinner, and so forth.26 In order to understand the significance of his account in 
full, however, it is necessary to review developments prior to Gaitskell’s move 
to  the  Treasury  as  Minister  of  State  (which  took  place  after  the  British 
general election of February 1950). 
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During  the  first  weeks  of  1950,  Cripps  came  under  challenge  from  his 
colleagues.  The  immediate  occasion  for  this  was  Gaitskell’s  response  to  a 
report  of  the  official  programmes  committee  that  was  presented  to  the 
cabinet’s  economic  policy  committee  by  Cripps  in  December  1949.  The 
paragraph of the report to which Gaitskell objected argued that: ‘It should be 
recognised  that  in  the  management  of  our  general  balance  of  payments 
indirect measures of control must play an increasing part, primarily by anti-
inflationary internal policies and a strict external financial policy’.27 This was a 
close  summation  of  the  main  thrust  of  Cripps’s  well-established 
macroeconomic strategy. But perhaps it was the explicit  way the argument 
was now stated – combined with pressure for liberalisation from the ECA - 
which led Gaitskell to conclude that this policy was not really compatible with 
the fundamental principles upon which the government’s economic policy had 
up  to  that  point  been  based.  With  the  help  of  Douglas  Jay,  he  drafted  a 
memorandum on ‘Economic planning and liberalisation’ which he presented 
to the economic policy committee in January.
Gaitskell argued that ‘The use by the Government of direct controls ... has 
been the distinguishing feature of British socialist planning’. Any attempt to 
abandon this policy, and to guide the economy solely ‘by indirect monetary 
means’  would lead either to inflation and a balance of payments crisis,  or 
deflation and unemployment. He admitted that in fact there was little danger 
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of the Labour government abolishing controls ‘consciously and positively’; but 
there was, however, ‘a real risk that we shall be drawn more and more in this 
direction  almost  unconsciously,  because  of  objections  to  and  criticisms  of 
specific controls’:
The greatest danger at present is, in our opinion, the pressure from 
E.C.A. and from other O.E.E.C. countries which are no longer seriously 
attempting  to  plan  their  own  economies.  One  form  in  which  this 
pressure is especially strong is the so-called ‘liberalisation’ of European 
trade.
(Such liberalisation, in the form of reduction of quantitative restrictions, was 
the necessary complement of the EPU.)  He concluded – amongst other things 
–  that  it  would  be  wise  to  appreciate  ‘that  the  policy  of  liberalisation  if 
extended will probably undermine the structure of physical control we have 
established’; and ‘to seek in O.E.E.C., and vis-a-vis E.C.A. if possible, to divert 
attention back to the real problem of achieving viability by increased dollar 
earnings and reduced dollar dependence.’28
Gaitskell  found substantial  support from other ministers for his ideas. This 
came  not  only  from  John  Strachey,  but  from  Harold  Wilson  and  Aneurin 
Bevan, both of whom he would clash with subsequently over the question of 
NHS funding, but with whom he now found himself in accord.29 Hugh Dalton 
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(the former Chancellor of the Exchequer, who had returned to the cabinet in 
1948) thought the memorandum ‘first class’. He recorded the impact of the 
committee’s views: ‘Cripps says, with a wan smile, that he supposes this is a 
vote of no confidence in the Chancellor. Of course we all deny this. It is meant, 
we say, for guidance to official advisers, who keep on giving advice which runs 
contrary to H. M. Government’s view of things’.30 But Cripps had associated 
himself  directly  with that advice,  even though he himself  was increasingly 
suspicious of the people giving it to him.31 Now he backtracked. According to 
the minutes of the meeting – which took place on 19 January - he ‘agreed that 
one had to be on one’s guard against those who thought in terms of a free 
rather than a planned economy’. He was, he said, in general agreement with 
the lines of policy that Gaitskell set out.32 This, as Dalton noted, was ‘a great 
score ... for the “young economists”.’ 33
Cripps had already been planning to take ‘inactive line’ on EPU during the 
forthcoming OEEC talks.34 Gaitskell’s attack, together with the fears held by 
the Bank of England, seems to have played a part in stiffening his attitude still 
further.35 (There  may  have  been  a  link  between  the  fears  of  the  junior 
ministers and those of the Bank. Some years later, one Treasury official, Denis 
Rickett,  recalled  that  ‘When  EPU was being  set  up,  the  Bank  of  England 
thought it would be the end of sterling, i.e. sterling held by Europe, and their 
fears excited Jay and Gaitskell.’)36  Already, in early January, Cripps had set 
out  his  qualifications  and objections  to the scheme.  These were threefold. 
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First, a system in which the EPU itself was the sole lender was unacceptable, 
as this would bring about a move from the existing bilateral arrangements 
(many  of  which  had  no  gold  points),  to  multilateral  arrangements  (which 
would have gold points). Second, Cripps wanted Britain to be able to control 
the imports of any country responsible for the loss of gold. Third, operation of 
the EPU should be largely automatic, so that its governing board would not be 
able to enforce deflationary policies on countries as a means of correcting 
fundamental disequilibrium.37 Now, on or around 19 January (probably after 
the  ministerial  meeting,  but  this  is  not  absolutely  clear),  the  Chancellor, 
seemingly stung into action by the ‘liberalisation’ memo, took an opportunity 
to lay into the Americans. In conversation with W. John Kenney, chief of the 
ECA mission to the UK, he adopted a ‘petulant and arrogant’ tone. ‘Cripps 
resented the interference of the U.S. in what he called a “schoolboy lecture” 
manner in the settlement of European problems.’ He addressed himself to the 
current  issues  before  the  OEEC,  including  trade  liberalisation,  the 
transferability of currencies, and the proposed visit to Paris of Harriman and 
Paul G. Hoffman (Administrator of the ECA) at the time of the next meeting of 
the OEEC Council and Consultative assembly. He felt this would give a note of 
US ‘dictation’ to the OEEC: ‘He particularly resented any possible statement 
of Hoffman detailing in (a), (b), (c), (d) manner what OEEC nations should 
do.’38 Cripps may have feared that any forthright statements might turn the 
emerging rift between Britain and the United States into a major issue in the 
forthcoming British election on 23 February.
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In reply to Kenney’s telegram, Harriman angrily voiced his suspicions that 
Cripps and the British government were trying to exploit the current conflict 
with  the  ECA  for  electoral  purposes  and  to  block  progress  in  European 
cooperation which the Americans had ‘every right to expect.’39  Harriman’s 
outburst prompted to Kenney to send a further telegram qualifying his initial 
account  of  his  conversation  with  Cripps.  Kenney  stressed  that  his 
conversation with Cripps had been frank and genial except for some extreme 
statements. In his view, the problem for the British government was that it 
had been unprepared for the ‘unplanned’ devaluation of sterling the previous 
September. Since British ministers liked to think of themselves as planners, 
they  found  it  difficult  to  accept  any  policy  initiative  for  further  European 
integration that might undermine its domestic economic plans.40 Despite their 
concerns about the British position,  Kenney, Harriman and Hoffman hoped 
that  a  private  conversation  with  Cripps  before  the  OEEC council  meeting 
might clear the air. However, Hoffman decided to cancel his planned stopover 
in  London  in  order  to  not  to  add  to  the  tensions  between  the  two 
governments.41
While  American policymakers sought  to  avoid  a  confrontation  with  British 
ministers, Cripps went to the OEEC council meeting in Paris at the end of the 
month  hoping  to  stymie  the  proposals  for  the  EPU  drawn  up  by  OEEC 
experts.42 He  argued  that  these  amounted  to  a  ‘return  to  automatic  gold 
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settlements in Europe which, if  it  were attempted in present conditions of 
dollar shortage, would necessarily restrict trade’. But, finding support only 
from the Scandinavian countries, he was forced to yield, and on 1 February 
agreed that the experts’ report could be issued and negotiations resumed on 
the basis of it.43 It was clear, though, that progress was not going to be easy 
prior  to  the  British  general  election.  After  the  disastrous  OEEC  council 
meeting, British ministers tried to undo some of the damage done by stressing 
that, contrary to the impression created by Cripps, the British government 
supported the creation of a payments union. On 11 February, Bevin reassured 
the American secretary of state, Dean Acheson, that he believed the problems 
over  the  relationship  between  EPU  and  the  sterling  area  were  not 
insurmountable.44 Cripps  struck  a  similar  note  in  a  conversation  with 
Kenney.45 At the same time, American policymakers refused to be drawn into 
bilateral  negotiations  with  the  British  government  leaving  it  to  the  newly 
appointed OEEC political conciliator Dirk Stikker, the Dutch foreign minister, 
to break the deadlock. Stikker met with Bevin and Cripps in mid-February and 
came  away  from  his  conversation  convinced  that  Bevin  was  genuinely 
committed  to  developing  European  cooperation.  At  the  same  time,  Bevin 
linked progress in economic integration to a deepening of western military 
cooperation in NATO and solving the problem of the sterling balances.46 At the 
same time, the sincerity of these reassurances can also seen by the inclusion 
of a commitment to give priority to the conclusion of a European payments 
union in the King’s  speech which contained otherwise a limited legislative 
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programme.47 However, the attempts by British ministers to link these issues 
irritated their American counterparts, who were trying to press forward their 
own policy agenda in these areas.48 
A  day  after  the  opening  of  the  new  parliament  on  7  March,  the  British 
government unofficially put forward a new plan, accompanied by a plea from 
Cripps to Hoffman not to ‘hustle us unduly on this matter’.49 Over the coming 
week, British ministers met with both Harriman and Stikker. While the new 
British  proposals  were  not  discussed  in  detail,  Bevin  and Cripps  used  the 
occasions to highlight the economic and political problems faced by the re-
elected  Labour  government  with  its  slender  parliamentary  majority.  In  his 
conversation with Harriman, Cripps outlined the difficulties in the Sterling 
Area and his concerns about the financial burden of western defence plans 
that were being discussed within the Western Union and NATO. Harriman 
came away thinking that Cripps would try to cooperate with the ECA but only 
on his terms.50 However,  under the British scheme, all  sterling claims and 
debts  would  have  continued,  in  principle,  to  be  financed  under  bilateral 
agreements,  and automatic  compensations would  have applied  only  to  the 
continental countries’ surpluses and deficits with one another.51 While these 
proposals would have protected British reserves, ECA officials regarded these 
proposals  as  unacceptable  to  both  the  USA  and  most  western  European 
governments. Therefore, ECA officials met with members of the British OEEC 
delegation to persuade them to withdraw their proposals. Henry Tasca, the 
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ECA official responsible for the EPU proposals in Paris, met with Sir Hugh 
Ellis-Rees on 11 March and bluntly told him that the new British proposals did 
not offer a solution to the EPU negotiations. The proposals envisaged neither 
full  multilateral  clearing nor incentives  for  debtors and creditors  to  adopt 
corrective measures - elements which the Americans regarded as essential. 
Tasca  stressed  that  American  officials  understood  the  special  position  of 
sterling  as  reserve  currency.  Nevertheless,  they  felt  it  was  misguided  to 
design a European clearing system around the possibility that Britain might 
develop a deficit in the future. As Britain was running a massive payments 
surplus  with  continental  countries  and  likely  remain  in  surplus  for  the 
foreseeable future, a system which safeguarded British reserves in case the 
country might be in deficit would suggest that sterling was weak and might 
undermine its position as a reserve currency. To address the British concerns, 
Tasca  suggests  that  the  ECA  might  consider  making  a  certain  amount  of 
dollars  available  to  cover  any  British  deficit  and  put  in  place  certain 
safeguards to prevent excessive drawings on sterling balances by continental 
countries.  At  the  end  of  their  conversation,  Tasca  stressed  that  the  ECA 
wanted to prevent a breakdown in the negotiations in the OEEC Payments 
Committee. In response,  Ellis-Rees suggested that a period of reflection of 
several  weeks before  negotiations  resumed.  Both men agreed to  pass this 
suggestion  onto  their  superiors  and  the  secretary-general  of  the  OEEC, 
Robert Marjolin.52 
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After  receiving  Ellis-Rees’  report,  Gaitskell  thought  that  if  the  ECA’s 
calculations as to how the British scheme would work had been applied only 
to the most recent period of all, Britain would have experienced gold losses, 
and  this  possibility  ‘rather  worried  me about  the  plan!’53 He  had,  indeed, 
written to Cripps on 15 March warning that the British proposals might mean 
losing too much gold: ‘I do urge that you should play this hand as long as 
possible and not give the impression that we are desperately anxious to reach 
agreement, even on the basis of our own scheme. It is after all just possible 
that it might really be better for us if the present negotiations were to break 
down and we were to have another look at the whole problem afresh. In any 
case  I  am  sure  that  it  will  pay  us  to  gain  time  and  not  be  rushed  into 
premature decisions on such a very vital issue.’ 54 Six days later Gaitskell – 
who had now taken over responsibility  for the EPU talks owing in part to 
Cripps’s poor health - noted in his diary: ‘We are certainly in for some difficult 
times in the field of overseas finance where the Americans seem to me to be 
getting on very wrong lines. Personally, I am sure that we shall have to have a 
complete  showdown  with  them  on  their  whole  approach  to  the  world’s 
economic problems.’55
While  Gaitskell  clearly  believed  that  a  confrontation  with  the  American 
government would be inevitable,  Katz and Harriman met with Sir Edmund 
Hall-Patch, the head of the British delegation to the OEEC, on 18 March to 
stress their concerns that the British proposals would lead to a breakdown of 
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the EPU negotiations in the OEEC Payments Committee. At the end of their 
conversation, Harriman emphasised that while he was convinced that Bevin 
wanted these negotiations to be brought to mutually satisfactory outcome, he 
remained  apprehensive  about  the  attitude  of  Cripps  and  the  Bank  of 
England.56 Sharing  these  concerns,  Hall-Patch,  either  at  this  meeting  or 
subsequently, but certainly prior to 25 March, spoke to Katz:
He said in effect: ‘I want to talk to you at great length and in great 
detail about what’s going on inside my government. I would like, before 
I start, to have your agreement that you won’t report this.’
I replied that, as he surely understood, I couldn’t possibly give any such 
commitment. ... Since I couldn’t give him any such assurances, he had 
to proceed on a presumption that I would report it.
‘Well,’ he said, ‘all right. I’ll do it anyway.’57
Hall-Patch himself was something of an enigma. According to Katz: ‘If there 
was ever a British career civil service and foreign service officer of the old 
school, it was Sir Edmund Hall-Patch – the way he dressed, the ties he wore, 
the  way  he  spoke.’58 According  to  the  ECA  deputy  administrator,  Richard 
Bissell,  Harriman  ‘had  a  poor  opinion  of  Hall-Patch,  the  representative  of 
Great Britain, who was a rather old-fashioned senior civil  servant and who 
regarded himself as a coequal to Harriman. If Harriman had been allowed to 
draw  the  organization  chart,  he  would  have  shown  Hall-Patch  as 
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corresponding to his deputy rather than him.’59 Yet his exterior was rather 
deceptive.  Edwin Plowden,  the British  government’s  chief  planning officer, 
noted that this ‘remarkable man’, before being seconded to the Foreign Office 
from the Treasury, had been at different times a saxophonist, a novelist, and a 
financial  adviser to the Siamese government.60 Eric  Roll,  a  member of  the 
OEEC delegation, recalled him as an ‘able, erudite and very reserved man ... 
who  managed to  combine  all  the  outward appearance  and manner  of  the 
Establishment  with  an  essentially  open and experimental  mind.’61 He was, 
moreover, a firm advocate of British economic cooperation with Europe.62
Hall-Patch’s motivation for calling on Katz can be explained – tentatively – by 
his attitude both to Labour ministers and to the Americans. In a 1964 oral 
history  interview, he recalled that ‘there were two remarkable men in the 
Labour government after the war, Ernest Bevin and Stafford Cripps. ... Cripps 
had the education and the intellectual background that Bevin lacked, but ... 
Bevin had vast experience of international negotiation in trade union affairs 
and was very effective in getting things done’. By contrast, although he did 
not offer any criticism of Gaitskell – who had died the previous year - he did 
not go out of his way to praise him. It seems probable, in view of remarks that 
he made to Katz in 1950, that his opinion of him was not great. Moreover, 
Hall-Patch  also  commented  in  1964  that  ‘the  great  degree  of  wartime 
cooperation  among  the  allies  was  a  background  for  the  effective 
administration  of  the  OEEC program.’63 So  it  seems likely  that  his  covert 
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mission to Katz was the result of a) the desire to help the admired Cripps out 
of an impasse, b) doubts about Gaitskell, and c) reliance on the spirit of old 
wartime associations with the USA.
In Katz’s recollection, the account that Hall-Patch gave him was as follows:
Within his government, within the cabinet, there was paralysis owing to 
a deadlock. Sir Stafford Cripps represented the senior members of the 
Cabinet;  he really  would  like to  adjust  to  the U.S.  position.  He was 
blocked by a younger group (whom Sir Edmund Hall-Patch described as 
the ‘socialist intelligentsia’ of the cabinet). He named individuals, and 
identified the leader of the younger group as Hugh Gaitskell. 
Hall-Patch added that there were one or two other leaders, such as Kenneth 
Younger (Minister of State at the Foreign Office), ‘but Gaitskell was really the 
key. Nothing useful could happen until the position of the bloc was altered.’ 
And the only way to break up the resistance of that was, Hall-Patch believed, 
for Gaitskell to meet Katz and talk with him. Katz said that he would do so 
willingly.64
Gaitskell was due to travel to Paris, and Hall-Patch arranged for Katz to meet 
him at Hall-Patch’s flat. According to Kaplan and Schleiminger, the meeting in 
question,  which  Katz  recalled  in  detail,  took  place  on  2  June.65 However, 
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Gaitskell’s published diary contains a long minute headed ‘Paris dinner on 
E.P.U., 25.3.50’, and the entry for 26 May notes:
in Paris I managed to have an extremely interesting talk with Harriman 
and Katz (his chief deputy and the one who really know all about it), 
Stikker,  Dutch  Foreign  Minister  and  Marjolin,  Secretary-General  of 
O.E.E.C. This was at a dinner party given by Sir Edmund Hall-Patch 
who is head of the British delegation.
The minute also records that ‘By arrangement Harriman and Katz came early 
so that we could talk with them alone first.’66 This was surely the occasion to 
which Katz was referring. Katz recalled:
Before the lunch [sic],  Hall-Patch gave me a rundown on Gaitskell’s 
characteristics.  I  was prepared for  a  powerful  and rigid  man,  but  I 
really  hadn’t  foreseen  the  extent  of  the  distrust  he  felt  toward  the 
United States and ECA. When he began to talk, Gaitskell turned to me 
and said he wanted to make one thing clear to me at the outset; neither 
he nor anybody else in Britain was going to submit to having the United 
States reimpose the gold standard on Britain.
Well,  I  can assure you that nothing remotely approximating such an 
intention had ever occurred to anybody that I knew. I looked at him in 
utter astonishment and realized that he was dead serious. His distrust 
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and misunderstanding of us was sufficient so that he really thought we 
had some such program in mind.67
Gaitskell’s minute of the discussion was long and detailed. Although he did 
not record himself using the precise phrase about ‘reimposition of the gold 
standard’ that Katz recalled, he certainly did make clear his strong distaste 
for having a gold element in the scheme, and his fear that Britain would as a 
consequence be forced to take deflationary measures:
I said I thought that there was really no dispute whatever about the 
desirability of multilateral payments: we were just as keen on that as 
everyone else. But we were naturally bound to be concerned with even 
the most remote danger to our gold and dollar reserve. This was still 
far  too low for  us to take any risks at all.  In  these circumstances I 
questioned  the  wisdom of  bringing  into  the  scheme automatic  gold 
points.
According to Gaitskell, Katz replied to him in detail on this question, playing 
down its importance ‘and said that it was in order to bring “gentle” pressure 
on debtor countries that eventually after credits were exhausted, some gold 
had to be paid.’ Katz emphasised that under the scheme creditor countries 
were also penalised – in that the larger their surplus the less the proportion 
they  could  take  in  gold.  (‘This  seems  to  me  by  no  means  clear’,  noted 
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Gaitskell.) The discussion also touched on the general question of what action 
debtor  countries  should  take.  Gaitskell  recorded:  ‘I  made it  plain  that  we 
could not accept any obligation to deflate as such.’ Katz and Harriman
vigorously  disavowed any intention of  forcing deflation on anyone.  I 
then asked why it was that they were so keen on the gold movements to 
which only the vague answer was forthcoming that these were a kind of 
signal to get the debtor to do something. On the whole I got the distinct 
impression that they would not object to modification of the scheme 
which diminished the risk of gold losses.
Summarising  his  ‘impressions  and  conclusions  from  this  interesting  talk’, 
Gaitskell  wrote  that  ‘E.C.A.  are  themselves  not  so  much  concerned  with 
getting dollars & gold into the multilateral payments scheme and it should not 
be difficult to bring home to them the dangers of this.’ The pressure to bring 
in  gold  and  dollars,  he  concluded,  was  coming from the IMF and the  US 
Treasury. ‘But in the battle we shall have to fight with the latter, E.C.A. might 
become our allies.’ 
Gaitskell was right that the US administration was divided. There were fears 
in  some  quarters  that  it  would  be  difficult  to  reconcile  the  EPU,  which 
permitted discrimination against the dollar, with broader American policy on 
non-discrimination  and  convertibility.68 Nevertheless,  he  was  wrong  to 
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imagine that the insistence on gold and dollar points was merely the result of 
a US Treasury fetish. Indeed, it is difficult to see how the scheme could have 
worked effectively without them. It was partly for this reason, no doubt, that 
one  Bank  official  described  Gaitskell’s  paper  as  ‘full  of  the  most  facile 
optimism’.69  Gaitskell concluded:
I should personally like to see our working away at a draft Payments 
Scheme which  would be (a) acceptable to other European countries – 
especially  France,  (b)  attractive  to  E.C.A.  because  we  stopped 
unilateral discrimination, (c) safer for us because it would reduce the 
risks  of  gold  payments  to  negligible  proportions.  [Emphasis  in 
original.]70
What was the overall significance of the meeting? It can be seen that Gaitskell 
was  now  moving  –  albeit  very  tentatively  –  towards  acceptance  that  the 
scheme would have to involve some gold element, even that element were to 
be so small as to ‘reduce the risks of gold payments to negligible proportions’, 
and  even  if  he  still  found  the  idea  highly  distasteful.  Nevertheless,  it  is 
important not to attribute all of Gaitskell’s change of heart to his exchange 
with Katz, any more than one should overstate its extent. Part of Gaitskell’s 
new emphasis on finding a payments arrangement that would put an end to 
unilateral discrimination was due to Marjolin’s argument, made at the same 
dinner, that the ending of Britain’s use of trade discrimination within Europe 
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was the essential precondition of European military and political cooperation. 
‘If there was to be cooperation in the military sphere there had to be good 
feeling. This could not exist in the face of acts of economic warfare.’ Gaitskell 
was favourably impressed, as well, by Marjolin’s apparent lack of interest in 
any extensive pooling of European economic sovereignty.71 
In the week prior to the Paris dinner, the government’s economic advisers, 
Robert Hall and Plowden, had ‘had a lot of reasoning’ with Gaitskell over gold 
points, leading Hall to conclude that ‘if we had time we could convert him’. 
This  did  not  bear  fruit  quickly,  even  after  the  meeting  with  Katz  and 
Harriman. Hall noted on 17 April:
Gaitskell ... is very doubtful about whether we [i.e. civil servants] are 
right to want to go as far as we have been suggesting in our relations to 
convertibility in EPU and to the USA generally. He wants to see sterling 
inconvertible (except for strictly controlled transactions with the dollar 
area, and the dollar ration for the sterling area) – no gold settlements 
with anyone else and no relaxations at all at any rate until it is proved 
that there won’t be a US slump. This would be an almost impossible 
starting point for any further talks with the US and would be regarded 
by them as a reversal of our policy up to date ... 72
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Gaitskell,  then,  for  the  time  being  remained  ‘pathological  about  gold 
settlements’.73 But the Paris dinner, if it had not caused Gaitskell to have a 
Damascene conversion, did mark the beginnings of the erosion of his distrust 
of the Americans. As Katz recalled: ‘There followed a long process of meetings 
together. As these meetings went on, we became more and more relaxed with 
one another.  Ultimately  we became very  close friends  and remained close 
friends until his death.’74
There was also a context that went beyond the personal - that of the cold war. 
US Secretary of State Dean Acheson was due to arrive in London in May. To 
prepare the ground for a stronger American commitment to the defence of 
Western Europe, Bevin stressed to the cabinet that the Americans wanted the 
British ‘to give more of a lead in Europe, particularly in such matters as the 
European Payments Union’.75 It  was partly for reasons of military security, 
then, that the Attlee government in due course chose to involve Britain with 
the scheme. That is to say, the explanation for its actions lies to a significant 
degree  in  the  political  sphere  that  lay  beyond  the  technicalities  of  the 
payments negotiations themselves. But if this high-level political will existed, 
it still had to be translated into a negotiating outcome.
The ECA was now making a concerted effort to break the deadlock with the 
British.  On  the  one  hand,  an  attempt  was  made to  isolate  the  British  by 
announcing that $600 million of European Recovery Program funds would be 
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put aside to support the EPU even if not all OEEC countries joined it. (This 
figure  was  subsequently  reduced  to  $500  million.)  On  the  other  hand,  as 
Triffin recalled,  the ECA ‘at the same time made a determined attempt to 
clarify the underlying sources of British opposition to EPU and to eliminate all 
objections which could be met without sacrificing the fundamental objectives 
of  the  plan.’  Katz  and  Harriman’s  discussions  with  Gaitskell  at  the  Paris 
dinner were presumably part of this attempt at clarification; certainly, Hall-
Patch’s intervention must have contributed to the US awareness that British 
opposition was less unanimous than it appeared on the surface, an awareness 
that helped stimulate the Americans to find a way out of the impasse.76
As Triffin noted, one of the aspects of the EPU that concerned the British most 
was its impact on the fate of sterling balances that would in future accrue to 
members of the union. These balances would be automatically wiped out in 
the monthly compensations and replaced by a claim on, or a reduction in debt 
to, the union, even though a country acquiring such balances might have been 
prepared to hold onto them as part of their monetary reserves. The UK also 
feared  the  additional  gold  losses  to  the  EPU  that  might  result  from  the 
multilateral use in EPU settlements of the large bilateral  sterling balances 
previously accumulated by European countries. ECA developed solutions to 
meet these worries. The first was to authorize surplus countries to exchange 
the credit, but not the gold, portion of their EPU claims for equivalent sterling 
balances, provided that these remained fully usable in future EPU settlements 
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with any participating country, and not only within the sterling area.  ‘This 
amendment did not, therefore, modify in any way the multilateral system of 
EPU settlements nor the respective proportions of gold and credits in such 
settlements. It did,  however, remove a real roadblock to the resumption of 
sterling’s traditional role as a component of international currency reserves.’ 
The second ECA suggestion was that the use of, or the amortization by Britain 
of, existing sterling balances accumulated by European countries prior to the 
creation of the EPU, would no longer be restricted bilaterally, but would have 
to  be  channelled  through  the  union.  All  balances  on  which  a  specific 
amortization schedule was not agreed upon between the UK and her creditors 
could be freely used by the latter, but only to the extent necessary to cover 
their net deficits to the union. The ECA would reimburse the UK for any gold 
it might have to pay to the EPU because of such use. However, although they 
proved crucial in breaking the negotiating deadlock, these concessions turned 
out to have little value in practice.77
A modified version of the ECA proposals, endorsed by Italian, French, Dutch 
and Swiss representatives to the OEEC, was presented to the British, at the 
end of April. There was an element of subterfuge: the British were told that it 
had  been  drawn  up  by  Hubert  Ansiaux,  Director  of  the  National  Bank  of 
Belgium, although they do not seem to have been fooled.78 Reportedly, both 
Cripps and Gaitskell ‘heartily disliked the Ansiaux plan.’79 At a meeting with 
Cripps,  Gaitskell  and  Jay  ‘pleaded  for  a  system  which  left  our  bilateral 
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arrangements intact… the Chancellor decided that officials must work out a 
middle course which kept the bilaterals adequately alive without attributing 
too much importance to them.’80 
But when US Secretary of State Dean Acheson arrived in London in May for 
wide-ranging  talks,  he  was  determined  to  press  hard  for  the  multilateral 
approach.81 The  British  now  accepted,  broadly  speaking  the  ‘continental’ 
approach, to which they had made their own modifications. Cripps reported to 
his colleagues on 15 May that satisfactory progress had been made in the 
preliminary  talks  with  the  Americans  about  the  revised  proposals.82 As 
Gaitskell noted later, Harriman and his advisers had turned up at the Treasury 
at quite short notice:
After about half an hour the Chancellor handed the whole thing over to 
me and Harriman handed his  side  over  to  Katz.  We then had some 
intensive negotiating which ended in effect with our giving way to the 
Americans on the technical problem of relating sterling to E.P.U. while 
we made it plain that we would only agree to this if we got satisfaction 
on the gold and credit arrangements.83 
Katz recalled: ‘we had plenary power to settle the problem. We went on and 
on and on. Eventually we worked out a solution which became known as the 
Katz-Gaitskell agreement.’84
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Shortage of time formed the backdrop to this agreement; the existing intra-
European payments  arrangements  were due to  expire  at  the  end of  June. 
Between 31 May to 3 June, Gaitskell and members of the UK delegation in 
Paris engaged with the ministers of the principal OEEC countries, as well as 
with the Americans. Kaplan and Schleiminger assert that Gaitskell began the 
talks ‘by asserting that Britain would not submit to having the US impose the 
gold standard on it.’ 85 This seems very unlikely; the error seems to arise from 
their misdating of the Hall-Patch dinner that took place in March. Hall-Patch 
noted: ‘As the negotiations proceeded it became abundantly clear that there 
was  no  hope  of  securing  any  material  improvement  on  the  Americans’ 
proposals.’86 The  British  wanted  large  EPU quotas,  a  great  proportion  of 
which  were to  be gold  free,  and  a  substantial  proportion  of  credit  in  the 
remainder.  The  Katz-Gaitskell  agreement  was based on total  quotas  of  $4 
billion  ($1.2  billion  less  than  the  British  had  wanted)  and  on  an  overall 
credit/gold  ratio  of  3:2  (this  was within  the  range of  acceptability  for  the 
British,  although they would have preferred 2:1).  Quotas would be divided 
into five equal segments, rather than the two preferred by Britain, the first 
fifth being completely free for creditors and debtors alike. Creditors would 
accept payment in gold and credit in equal proportions over the rest of their 
quotas,  whereas  debtors  would  receive  progressively  less  credit  as  they 
moved through their quotas (from 75% credit in the second segment to 25% 
in the fifth).87
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 As Hall-Patch noted on 6 June, Gaitskell required the support of Cripps, ‘To 
fortify  him  in  his  final  recommendations  to  colleagues  in  the  Cabinet’. 
Accordingly,  Hall-Patch wrote,  Eric  Roll  had been sent  to  Briançon,  where 
Cripps was convalescing, ‘to explain to the Chancellor the full implications of 
some of the recent American proposals.’88 Roll’s own later recollection had a 
slightly different emphasis: ‘at one stage [in the EPU talks], almost the last, 
some difficult  problem arose and Gaitskell  did not want to take a decision 
without consulting Cripps’.  However, after Roll’s  arrival,  the point at issue 
was settled very quickly over breakfast.89 Once the Katz-Gaitskell agreement 
was  concluded,  both  Cripps  and  Attlee  agreed  to  it  promptly,  and  this 
agreement was communicated to the Americans on 7 June. 90
After  the  Katz-Gaitskell  agreement  was  signed,  and  the  British  joined  in 
helping to bring the European Payments Union to fruition,  a new problem 
developed. ‘At that point,’ Katz recalled wearily, ‘the Belgians and the Swiss 
came out from behind the curtains and made it clear they were resisting on an 
entirely different basis. [Maurice] Frère, the Governor of the Bank of Belgium, 
came to see me and explained that the Bank had lots of dollars, which he 
intended to cultivate and preserve. He would not weaken his position or risk 
weakening it, in order to help “prodigal countries” through any arrangement 
requiring  extra  credit  from  his  bank.’91 However,  the  US  stood  firm.  All 
substantive  provisions  of  the  Katz-Gaitskell  agreement  were  adopted 
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unanimously  by  the  OEEC  Council  on  7  July,  and  the  legal  instrument 
embodying them was signed on 19 September with retroactive effect to 1 July 
1950.92
The ease with which the Katz-Gaitskell agreement had been sold to Cripps 
rather belies what Gaitskell told the US chargé d’affaires upon his return to 
London. He claimed – rather cheekily, it may be thought – that past troubles 
had resulted from the inflexibility of his own associates, including Cripps.93 
The Americans, for their own part,  had long seen Cripps as the stumbling 
block. Harriman commented at a meeting of US ambassadors in March that 
‘Cripps and the doctrinaire socialist group of the Labor Party ... fear the effect 
of  trade  liberalization  on  their  own  doctrinaire  concept  of  planning.’94 
Cairncross,  too,  has  implied  that  the  problem  lay  with  Cripps.95 Yet  the 
toughness  of  Cripps’s  stance  had,  at  the  very  least,  been  propped  up  by 
Gaitskell’s  anti-liberalisation  views,  and,  according  to  Hall-Patch,  was  the 
direct result of them. As Gaitskell himself noted in May, ‘I find myself in the 
rather surprising position of having to stiffen him [Cripps] up on almost every 
occasion.’96 When Gaitskell accepted – broadly – the American attitude to the 
EPU, Cripps’s doubts about the scheme melted away. Moreover, as Harriman 
later recalled, in connection with EPU, ‘One thing about Cripps was that after 
he made an agreement he always did a little better than he said he would. It 
was very tough to get him to agree to something, but after he came to an 
agreement he was very cooperative.’97 In the case under discussion, this may 
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have been because Cripps’s initial instinct to cooperate – attested to by Hall-
Patch - had been stymied, and he wanted to make good the deficit. However, 
he  was  only  able  to  do  so  once  Gaitskell’s  objections  were,  one  way  or 
another, overcome. 
Hall-Patch’s intervention, then, was the key to the resolution of the situation. 
This was Katz’s view: ‘I want to stress that this wouldn’t have worked out if 
Hall-Patch,  violating  the  tight  pattern  of  a  discreet  and  conventional 
traditional civil servant hadn’t taken it upon himself to come and talk to me.’ 
He argued that, in turn, Hall-Patch’s demarche had only been made possible 
by  a  previously  established,  and  crucially  important,  ‘far-flung  network  of 
mutually  supporting  relationships’  emerging  from  the  structure  of  the 
Marshall Plan.
The relationships between the United States and Europe ... existed at 
every level.  It wasn’t just President to Prime Minister; it  wasn’t just 
Secretary  of  State  to  Foreign  Minister;  it  wasn’t  just  Secretary  of 
Treasury  to  Finance  Minister.  From  top  to  bottom,  throughout  the 
entire  bureaucracy  and  the  entire  civil  service,  there  were intimate 
working  relationships,  and  these  were  supplemented  by  external 
relationships  among  university,  professional,  industrial,  and  labor 
personnel.98 
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The Katz-Gaitskell  relationship  was another  strand of  the web, one which, 
although it developed comparatively late in the day, turned out to be of key 
importance.  In  August  1950,  Gaitskell  mused  on  the  ironies  of  recent 
developments:
It  is  rather  odd  that  after  acquiring  a  reputation  within  the  U.K. 
Government  for  objecting  to  so  much  of  what  the  Americans  were 
trying to do in Europe I should yet have been able to get on with them 
so well. I think the explanation is that most of them had fundamentally 
the same outlook as I had. They were and are economist new-dealer 
types, and anxious to get the same kind of payment system going as we 
were ourselves.99
Arguably, Gaitskell was here disguising, even from himself, the true extent of 
his own change of heart. In March 1950, he had been completely hostile to 
the  idea  of  a  gold  element  in  the  EPU  scheme,  to  the  point  where  he 
suggested  to  Katz  that  such  an  idea  amounted  to  a  return  to  the  gold 
standard. By July, he was blithe in his assurance to the House of Commons 
that  EPU was  not  ‘an  extreme gold  standard  arrangement’.100 To  a  cynic, 
Gaitskell’s behaviour could seem to be a typical Yes, Minister scenario: that of 
the  politician  who,  finessed  by  his  civil  servants,  performs  an  about-face 
whilst convincing himself he has just won a great personal victory.
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It should be emphasised, however, that Gaitskell did not henceforward accept 
supinely the US world-view of international economic relations. For example, 
he  strongly  supported  a  United  Nations  scheme  for  the  co-ordination  of 
national  full  employment policies.101 This  type of  ‘fairly  extreme Keynesian 
solution’ was not the kind of international cooperation the Americans had in 
mind.102 But  certainly  he  had  warmed  towards  the  Americans.  Richard 
Crossman  noted  in  February  1952:  ‘I  am  sure  Gaitskell  is  a  very  good 
economist but politically he is just determined to believe that there is a “good 
America”, which he can side with.’103 This may have been unfair, but the fact 
that he was by this  point  perceived in this  way by left-wingers  shows the 
distance that he had travelled since January 1950, when, as a member of the 
cabinet’s ‘socialist intelligentsia’, he was receiving backing from Bevan and 
Wilson  for  his  opposition  to  American-sponsored  economic  liberalisation. 
From the point of view of British domestic politics, his change of heart over 
EPU forms an important part of the backdrop to the 1951 budget crisis and 
the subsequent Bevanite split. It also had a wider significance in terms of the 
Anglo-American relationship.
Conclusion
Gaitskell’s conversion from an ardent critic of convertibility into a supporter 
of  limited  intra-European  convertibility  can only  be  understood  within  the 
broader context of the Atlantic alliance. The personal relationship between 
Gaitskell  and Katz and the actions of Hall-Patch were important; but these 
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were  merely  the  mechanisms  by  which  the  actions  of  a  junior  (though 
important)  minister  were  brought  into  line  with  the  overall  strategic 
objectives of his political superiors, which lay as much in the military as the 
economic  sphere.  We may  even  question  whether  Hall-Patch’s  clandestine 
mission to Katz was really on the freelance basis that he presented it. If Bevin 
wanted, in effect, to subvert Gaitskell’s intransigence on an economic issue so 
as to improve Anglo-American relations more widely, who better to send as his 
agent  than  this  unconventional  mandarin?  And,  assuming  that  any  such 
instruction was conveyed by word of mouth, what better way to preserve the 
principle of ‘deniability’? 
By the very nature of the case, such a hypothesis cannot be proven. But it 
does not really matter whether Hall-Patch was acting directly on instructions 
or  merely  intuiting  his  masters’  wishes.  Either  way,  it  is  clear  that  the 
conventional way of looking at the outcome of the EPU talks – that is to say, 
was it Britain or America that ‘won’ – is too restrictive. The concessions made 
by  the  US may  have  been  largely  tactical  ones,  so  the  result  could,  in  a 
narrow sense,  be presented as an American victory.  But whilst  the British 
gave much ground over the form of the EPU itself, they did not so much ‘lose’ 
the negotiation as decide to make a big concession in the wider strategic 
game. It was, therefore, a ‘win-win’ situation, whereby the US administration 
gained the technical outcome it desired over European payments, which in 
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turn helped the British to strengthen the US commitment to NATO. Therefore, 
the British decision to join EPU can in no way be regarded as a fluke.
The obvious way to challenge this argument is to suggest that it makes the 
whole  process  sound  much  too  rational.  After  all,  key  players,  notably 
Gaitskell, were in the dark about various important developments, and appear 
to have been operating at times under certain kinds of delusion. Certainly, we 
do not wish to deny the Labour government’s deep confusion on questions of 
European  integration.  The  best-known  example  of  this,  the  mishandled 
rejection of the Schuman proposals for a European coal and steel community, 
coincided with the EPU negotiations. As Eric Roll has put it, hesitation over 
integration was ‘strengthened by a desire to preserve world-wide links and, in 
particular, to maintain a special position  vis-à-vis the United States, despite 
the clear existence of a very strong American trend to encourage European 
integration  with  (and in  some American minds  only  with)  the  inclusion  of 
Britain.’104 Nevertheless, in the case of EPU, the British can be seen to have 
reached the right decision – although, to paraphrase Churchill, only after they 
had exhausted the alternatives.  If  they had difficulty feeling their way, not 
least  as  a  consequence  of  some  of  their  ideological  preoccupations,  they 
ultimately made a wise choice: to embed the British economy more firmly in a 
world economy based on Atlantic military co-operation. Therefore, the story of 
the Attlee government and Europe was not simply or exclusively one of ‘the 
abdication  of  British  leadership’,  as  some  commentators  would  have  it.105 
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Rather, it was the tale of a struggle to resolve competing obligations, and, in 
this  case,  of  the  pragmatic  subordination  of  economic  anxieties  in  the 
interests of military security. 
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